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Institutional investors and cost stickiness: Theory and evidence
被引:21
|作者:
Chung, Chune Young
[1
]
Hur, Seok-Kyun
[1
]
Liu, Chang
[2
]
机构:
[1] Chung Ang Univ, Sch Business Adm, Coll Business & Econ, 84 Heukseok Ro, Seoul 06974, South Korea
[2] Hawaii Pacific Univ, Coll Business, 900 Ft St Mall,Suite 600, Honolulu, HI 96813 USA
关键词:
Institutional monitoring;
Cost stickiness;
F-score;
Corporate governance;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM;
AGENCY COSTS;
OWNERSHIP;
MARKET;
DETERMINANTS;
INVESTMENT;
EARNINGS;
BEHAVIOR;
BOARDS;
D O I:
10.1016/j.najef.2018.05.002
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Cost stickiness measures the degree of suboptimal cost reduction in response to a decline in a firm's activity. This study examines the role of institutional monitoring in addressing the value decreasing cost-stickiness problem exhibited in many firms. Using alternative proxies for institutional monitoring, we find that long-term institutional investors are associated with reductions in cost stickiness and that these reductions lead to superior future market and accounting performance. Our findings are robust to different model specifications and are independent of the effect of internal governance.
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页码:336 / 350
页数:15
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