EFFICIENT POLICY IN A PREDATORY ECONOMY: TO HIM WHO HATH SHALL BE GIVEN?

被引:6
作者
Anderson, James E. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Boston Coll, Dept Econ, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00675.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Trade subject to predation generates externalities within and between markets. Efficient tax, infrastructure, and enforcement policies internalize the net externalitymore trade implies fewer predators but drawn to trade at rising cost. The balance is positive (negative) as enforcement is weak (strong). Dual economies pair weak Periphery and strong Core enforcement markets. Efficient taxation and infrastructure promote the Core at the expense of the Periphery. Efficient enforcement promotes both. Tolerance (intolerance) of smuggling is efficient when Core enforcement is weak (strong). Tolerance of informal market Mafias that provide enforcement and infrastructure is efficient when Core enforcement is strong.
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页码:157 / 174
页数:18
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