Vertical relations in the air transport industry: A facility-rivalry game

被引：28

作者：

D'Alfonso, Tiziana ^{[1
,2
]}

Nastasi, Alberto ^{[1
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Roma La Sapienza, Dept Comp Control & Management Engn, I-00185 Rome, Italy

[2] Univ Bergamo, Dept Econ & Technol Management, I-24044 Dalmine, BG, Italy

[3] ICCSAI, I-24050 Orio Al Serio, BG, Italy

来源：

TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW | 2012年 / 48卷 / 05期

关键词：

Vertical contracts; Airports competition; Airlines competition; COMPETITION; AIRPORTS; EFFICIENCY; AIRLINES; REVENUE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.tre.2012.03.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper investigates contracts between airports and airlines, in the context of two competing facilities and three types of agreements. The downstream market consists in a route operated by one leader and n - 1 followers competing a la Stackelberg in each facility. We develop a multistage game where each airport and its dominant airline decide whether to enter into a contract and which one to engage in. We find that the airport and its dominant airline have incentives to collude in each facility. Nevertheless, the equilibrium is not efficient in terms of social welfare: there is a misalignment between private and social incentives. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：993 / 1008

页数：16

共 20 条

[1] Network competition-the coexistence of hub-and-spoke and point-to-point systems [J].