LUCRETIAN PUZZLES

被引:1
作者
Rabenberg, Michael [1 ]
机构
[1] NYU, Ctr Bioeth, New York, NY 10003 USA
来源
ERGO-AN OPEN ACCESS JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2021年 / 8卷
关键词
SYMMETRY ARGUMENT; FUTURE-BIAS; DEATH; ASYMMETRY; TIME; NONEXISTENCE; FEAR; PAIN; EVIL;
D O I
10.3998/ergo.1142
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
It seems that people typically prefer dying later to dying earlier. It also seems that people typically do not prefer having been created earlier to having been created later. Lucretius' Puzzle is the question whether anything typically rationally recommends having a preference for dying later to dying earlier over having a preference for having been created earlier to having been created later. In this paper, I distinguish among three ways in which Lucretius' Puzzle can be understood and say how I think they ought to be answered.
引用
收藏
页码:110 / 140
页数:31
相关论文
共 28 条
[11]   The evil of death and the Lucretian symmetry: a reply to Feldman [J].
Fischer, John Martin ;
Brueckner, Anthony .
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, 2013, 163 (03) :783-789
[12]   Against Time Bias [J].
Greene, Preston ;
Sullivan, Meghan .
ETHICS, 2015, 125 (04) :947-970
[13]  
Harman E, 2009, PHILOS PERSPECT, V23, P177
[14]  
Harman Elizabeth., 2011, Social Theory and Practice, V1, P129
[15]  
Johansson J., 2013, Journal of Ethics, V17, P51, DOI DOI 10.1007/S10892-012-9137-3
[16]  
Kamm F., 1993, MORALITY MORTALITY
[17]   AN ANSWER TO LUCRETIUS SYMMETRY ARGUMENT AGAINST THE FEAR OF DEATH [J].
KAUFMAN, F .
JOURNAL OF VALUE INQUIRY, 1995, 29 (01) :57-64
[18]  
Kaufman F, 1999, AM PHILOS QUART, V36, P1
[19]   DEATH AND DEPRIVATION, OR, WHY LUCRETIUS SYMMETRY ARGUMENT FAILS [J].
KAUFMAN, F .
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 1996, 74 (02) :305-312
[20]  
Kaufman Frederik., 2000, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, V24, P94, DOI DOI 10.1111/1475-4975.00023