Consumer networks and firm reputation: A first experimental investigation

被引：15

作者：

Huck, Steffen ^{[2
,3
]}

Luenser, Gabriele K. ^{[2
,3
]}

Tyran, Jean-Robert ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Copenhagen, Dept Econ, DK-1168 Copenhagen, Denmark

[2] UCL, Dept Econ, London WC1E 6BT, England

[3] UCL, ELSE, London WC1E 6BT, England

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2010年 / 108卷 / 02期

基金：

英国经济与社会研究理事会;

关键词：

Trust; Consumer networks; Moral hazard; Information conditions; Reputation; TRUST; TRUSTWORTHINESS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2010.04.017

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine the role of consumer networks in markets that suffer from moral hazard. Consumers exchange information with neighbors about past experiences with different sellers. Networks foster incentives for reputation building and enhance trust and efficiency in markets. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：242 / 244

页数：3

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