Are Corporate General Counsels in Top Management Effective Monitors? Evidence from Stock Price Crash Risk

被引:14
作者
Al Mamun, M. D. [1 ]
Balachandran, Balasingham [1 ]
Duong, Huu Nhan [2 ]
Gul, Ferdinand A. [3 ]
机构
[1] La Trobe Univ, Dept Econ & Finance, Bundoora, Vic 3086, Australia
[2] Monash Univ, Dept Banking & Finance, Clayton, Vic, Australia
[3] Deakin Univ, Deakin Business Sch, Burwood, Australia
关键词
Corporate general counsel; Discretionary accruals; Opaque financial reports; Stock price crash risk; EQUITY INCENTIVES; PROPENSITY SCORE; COMPENSATION; GOVERNANCE;
D O I
10.1080/09638180.2020.1763819
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We find that firms with a top management counsel (TMC) have lower stock price crash risk than other firms. We further show that firms with aTMCissue more negative relative to positive earnings guidance and use more negative relative to positive words in their annual report filings, compared to firms without aTMC.TMCs are more effective in mitigating crash risk when they serve on the board. Our findings support the monitoring role ofTMCs in mitigating bad news hoarding, which, in turn, contributes to the reduction in crash risk.
引用
收藏
页码:405 / 437
页数:33
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