Shareholder approval thresholds in acquisitions: Evidence from tender offers

被引：8

作者：

Boone, Audra ^{[1
]}

Broughman, Brian ^{[2
]}

Macias, Antonio J. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Texas Christian Univ, Ft Worth, TX 76129 USA

[2] Indiana Univ, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA

[3] Baylor Univ, Waco, TX 76798 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2018年 / 53卷

关键词：

Shareholder voting; Tender offer; Mergers; Acquisitions; Delaware law; MERGERS; RETURNS; MARKET; FIRMS; CEOS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.10.005

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We exploit a 2013 Delaware law that reduces the shareholder support threshold for two-step tender offers to investigate the impact of differing levels of shareholder support on deal structures and outcomes. After the legal change, Delaware acquisitions, as opposed to other states, are more likely to be completed via tender offer, and Delaware targets collectively receive greater acquisition premiums and returns relative to firms incorporated in other states. Our results caution that supermajority shareholder approval thresholds can increase the risk of shareholder holdup and have little (if any) effect on managerial self-dealing.

引用

页码：225 / 245

页数：21

共 45 条

[1] Bargaining power and industry dependence in mergers [J].