Are responses to official consultations and stakeholder surveys reliable guides to policy actors' positions?

被引:9
作者
Ingold, Karin [1 ]
Varone, Frederic [2 ]
Kammerer, Marlene [1 ]
Metz, Florence [3 ]
Kammermann, Lorenz [1 ]
Strotz, Chantal [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bern, Bern, Switzerland
[2] Univ Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
[3] Swiss Fed Inst Technol, Zurich, Switzerland
[4] Univ Lucerne, Luzern, Switzerland
来源
POLICY AND POLITICS | 2020年 / 48卷 / 02期
基金
瑞士国家科学基金会;
关键词
policy positions; government consultations; stakeholder surveys; policy instruments; advocacy; energy policy; water protection; climate policy; DEVIL SHIFT; COALITIONS; POWER;
D O I
10.1332/030557319X15613699478503
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Policy positions are used extensively to explain coalition formation, advocacy success and policy outputs, and government consultations and stakeholder surveys are seen as important means of gathering data about policy actors' positions. However, we know little about how accurately official consultations and stakeholder surveys reflect their views. This study compares advocacy organisations' publicly stated positions in their responses to official consultations with their positions expressed in confidential surveys conducted by the authors. It compares three decision-making processes in Switzerland - in energy,climate and water protection - to analyse responses via two different types of data gathering methods. The results show a substantial divergence between official and private expressions of policy positions. Specific types of policy actors (losers), instruments (persuasive measures) and subsystems (collaborative network) produce more divergent positions. This has important methodological implications for comparative policy studies that use different data gathering methods and focus on different policy domains.
引用
收藏
页码:193 / 222
页数:30
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