Social norms, regulation, and environmental risk

被引：3

作者：

Qin, Botao ^{[1
]}

Shogren, Jason F. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Wyoming, Dept Econ & Finance, Laramie, WY 82071 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2015年 / 129卷

关键词：

Mechanism design; Social norms; Environmental risk; DESIGN;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.030

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We add social norms into Laffont's mechanism designed for environmental risk. We find with endogenous social norms and asymmetric information about personal norms, the optimal contract induces more (less) effort from the "green" ("brown") firm. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：22 / 24

页数：3

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