The Hotelling bi-matrix game

被引：0

作者：

von Mouche, Pierre ^{[1
]}

Pijnappel, Willem ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Postbus 6700, NL-6700 EW Wageningen, Netherlands

[2] Spechtstr 72, NL-5932 VK Tegelen, Netherlands

来源：

OPTIMIZATION LETTERS | 2018年 / 12卷 / 01期

关键词：

Bi-matrix game; Demi-modality; Hotelling; Location theory; Nash equilibrium; Tarski fixed point theorem; STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM;

D O I：

10.1007/s11590-015-0964-6

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

We study the pure equilibrium set for a specific symmetric finite game in strategic form, referred to as the Hotelling bi-matrix game. General results that guarantee non-emptiness of this set (for all parametric values) do not seem to exist. We prove non-emptiness by determining the pure equilibrium set. In this proof so-called demi-modality properties of the conditional payoff functions play an important role.

引用

页码：187 / 202

页数：16

共 7 条

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