Overlapping efforts in the EU Emissions Trading System

被引：7

作者：

Herweg, Fabian ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bayreuth, CESifo, Univ Str 30, D-95440 Bayreuth, Germany

[2] Univ Bayreuth, Fac Law Business & Econ, CEPR, Univ Str 30, D-95440 Bayreuth, Germany

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2020年 / 193卷

关键词：

Banking of permits; Cap-and-trade; EU ETS; National measures; BANKING;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109323

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

According to the Phase IV (2021-2030) rules of the EU ETS, the total amount of emission permits allocated to firms is not fixed but endogenous. This implies that a national climate policy that overlaps with the ETS can have an impact on total aggregate emissions. Roughly speaking, if firms increase their holdings of emission permits, the total amount of permits allocated is reduced. This paper analytically investigates how an overlapping national policy affects the aggregate bank of emission permits. If marginal abatement costs are not too convex, national climate policies increase banking and thus tend to reduce overall emissions. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：4

共 13 条

[1] The reformed EU ETS - Intertemporal emission trading with restricted banking [J].