Corruption and reputation

被引：5

作者：

Andrianova, S ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Loughborough, Loughborough, Leics, England

来源：

SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 2001年 / 48卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1467-9485.00197

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper examines corruption in a random matching game where past actions are imperfectly observed and players have the option to continue trading with their existing partners. It shows that the effect of individual reputations for honesty may outweigh the effect of a bad collective reputation depending on the expected value of a continued match relative to the corruption gain.

引用

页码：245 / 259

页数：15

共 12 条

[1]

Bardhan P, 1997, J ECON LIT, V35, P1320

[2] COOPERATION IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA WITH ANONYMOUS RANDOM MATCHING [J].