CENTRAL BANK GOVERNANCE - THE PREMISE OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE

被引:0
作者
Dumiter, Florin Cornel
Soim, Horatiu Florin
机构
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE IVTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GLOBALIZATION AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION - GEBA 2010 | 2011年
关键词
Central bank governance; monetary policy; trust and authority; central bank credibility; transparency and accountability;
D O I
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中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Nowadays it can be observed an important trend towards the analytical and theoretical evolutions and interconnections of credibility, trustworthiness, authority and central bank governance. A high degree of education and professionalism of the central banks officials granted through: independence from political pressures, pressures that finally exists through monetary stimulants of short term benefits, will lead to a high level of trustworthiness. In this paper, we present and discuss global trends in central bank governance based on some aspect: central bank independence, central bank accountability and central bank transparency
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页码:301 / 306
页数:6
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