Dual-class stock structure and firm investment

被引：6

作者：

Beladi, Hamid ^{[1
]}

Hu, May ^{[2
]}

Yang, JingJing ^{[3
]}

Zhu, Ruicheng ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Texas San Antonio, San Antonio, TX USA

[2] RMIT Univ, Melbourne, Australia

[3] Guangdong Univ Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, Peoples R China

来源：

FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS | 2022年 / 47卷

关键词：

China concept stocks; Dual-class share structure; Free cash flow; Cash dividends; Overinvestment; AGENCY COSTS; CASH FLOW; EFFICIENCY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.frl.2022.102939

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Dual-class stock structure helps insiders gain control through different voting rights, but also exacerbates the principal-agent conflict. The separation of control rights and cash flow rights enhances managerial opportunistic behavior. We find that dual-class stock structure aggravates the over-investment behavior of listed firms. The impact of free cash flow on over-investment is more severe in dual class firms than in single-class firms. Paying cash dividends reduces the effects of dual-class stock structure, and separation of control and cash flow rights on overinvestment. Regulators need to strengthen the supervision to restrict managerial opportunistic behavior in firms with dual-class share structure.

引用

页数：9

共 11 条

[1] Agency costs and ownership structure [J].