Defending non-derived content

被引：18

作者：

Aizawa, K ^{[1
]}

Adams, F ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Centenary Coll Louisiana, Dept Philosophy, Shreveport, LA 71134 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY | 2005年 / 18卷 / 06期

关键词：

original intentionality; derived intentionality; Daniel Dennett;

D O I：

10.1080/09515080500355186

中图分类号：

B82 [伦理学（道德学）];

学科分类号：

摘要：

In "The Myth of Original Intentionality," Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality. 1. Humans lack original intentionality. 2. Humans have derived intentionality only. 3. There is no distinction between original and derived intentionality. 4. There is no such thing as original intentionality. We argue that Dennett's discussion fails to secure any of these conclusions for the contents of thoughts.

引用

页码：661 / 669

页数：9