An Inertia-Based Data Recovery Scheme for False Data Injection Attack

被引:27
作者
Ruan, Jiaqi [1 ,2 ]
Liang, Gaoqi [1 ,3 ]
Zhao, Junhua [1 ,2 ]
Qiu, Jing [4 ]
Dong, Zhao Yang [3 ]
机构
[1] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Sci & Engn, Shenzhen 518100, Peoples R China
[2] Shenzhen Inst Artificial Intelligence & Robot Soc, Shenzhen 518100, Peoples R China
[3] Nanyang Technol Univ, Sch Elect & Elect Engn, Singapore 639798, Singapore
[4] Univ Sydney, Sch Elect & Informat Engn, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Pollution measurement; Power measurement; Weight measurement; Power grids; Phasor measurement units; Optimization; Data models; Cyber physical power system; cybersecurity; data recovery; measurement data inertia; STATE ESTIMATION; IDENTIFICATION; OPTIMIZATION;
D O I
10.1109/TII.2022.3146859
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Due to vulnerabilities exposed to cyberattacks in the cyber physical power system, increasing concerns have been paid to its cybersecurity, especially on the so-called false data injection attack. Timely recovering true values of measurements and states after encountering cyber-attacks is of paramount importance for ensuring the subsequent controls and operations of the cyber physical power system. This article, for the first time, discovers a measurement data inertia effect, and uses this effect to deduce coarse values of preattack measurements as a preliminary work for data recovery. Then, based on the deduced coarse values and suggested state bounds, an optimization model is proposed to recover the measurements and states contaminated by attacks in-time. Moreover, an error criterion named interval error is proposed to assess the entire performance of the proposed recovery scheme. Extensive and comprehensive experiments are implemented on the IEEE 30-bus test benchmark to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed recovery scheme. The numerical studies reveal that the proposed method can achieve high accuracy and efficient timeliness for data recovery.
引用
收藏
页码:7814 / 7823
页数:10
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