The use of auctions for allocating airport access rights

被引：18
作者：
Ball, Michael O. [1 ,2 ]
Berardino, Frank [3 ]
Hansen, Mark [4 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Maryland, Robert H Smith Sch Business, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[2] Univ Maryland, Inst Syst Res, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[3] GRA Inc, 115 West Ave,Suite 201, Jenkintown, PA 19046 USA
[4] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Civil & Environm Engn, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
来源：
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART A-POLICY AND PRACTICE | 2018年 / 114卷
关键词：
CONGESTION;
D O I：
10.1016/j.tra.2017.09.026
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper considers the challenge of managing congestion at an airport by restricting the total number of flight operations at that airport. It reviews historical evidence, economic theory and data analysis related to the challenge of airport congestion management. It argues that this evidence presents a strong case for the use of a market mechanism to control access and more specifically for the use of periodic auctions to allocate limited term slot leases. It then shows that the existing body of knowledge and practical experience with the use of combinatorial auctions lead naturally to highly viable auction designs for the airport slot context. It further provides analysis of a variety of specific issues related to the use of auctions in the context of airport slots.
引用
收藏
页码：186 / 202
页数：17
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