EXTERNALISM AND THE RESOLUTION OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE

被引：0

作者：

Horowitz, Amir ^{[1
]}

Jacobson, Hilla ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Open Univ Israel, Raanana, Israel

[2] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Fac Humanities & Social Sci, Dept Philosophy, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel

来源：

ACTA PHILOSOPHICA | 2010年 / 19卷 / 02期

关键词：

epistemology; externalism; self-knowledge; PRIVILEGED ACCESS;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

This paper suggests a new way for defending semantic externalism from what we take to be the most serious attack against it in the context of the discussion of the a priori nature of self-knowledge. We shall argue that the resolution of our a priori knowledge of our beliefs on the assumption that their contents are externally determined is identical to the resolution that it makes sense to attribute to our knowledge of our beliefs independently of any assumption about content-determination. We shall also suggest what might be the source of the conviction that supposedly externally-determined beliefs violate some general epistemological principle.

引用

页码：339 / 348

页数：10

共 10 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1987, Psychosemantics

[2]

Boghossian P., 1989, PHILOS TOPICS, V17, P5

[3]

Brown Jessica., 2004, ANTIINDIVIDUALISM KN

[4] INDIVIDUALISM AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE [J].