Foundations of incomplete contracts

被引：410

作者：

Hart, O ^{[1
]}

Moore, J

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[2] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London WC2A 2AE, England

[3] Univ St Andrews, St Andrews KY16 9AJ, Fife, Scotland

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1999年 / 66卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1467-937X.00080

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In the last few years, a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of "incomplete contracting". However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper, we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in Maskin and Tirole (1999a). In doing so, we develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.

引用

页码：115 / 138

页数：24

共 14 条

[1] STRATEGIC CONTRACTUAL INEFFICIENCY AND THE OPTIMAL CHOICE OF LEGAL RULES [J].