Identifying Networks Vulnerable to IP Spoofing

被引:9
作者
Fonseca, Osvaldo [1 ]
Cunha, Italo [1 ]
Fazzion, Elverton [2 ,3 ]
Meira Jr, Wagner [1 ]
da Silva Jr, Brivaldo Alves [4 ]
Ferreira, Ronaldo A. [4 ]
Katz-Bassett, Ethan [5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Fed Minas Gerais, DCC, BR-31270901 Belo Horizonte, MG, Brazil
[2] Univ Fed Minas Gerais, BR-31270901 Belo Horizonte, MG, Brazil
[3] Univ Fed Sao Joao del Rei, DCOMP, BR-36301360 Sao Joao Del Rei, Brazil
[4] Univ Fed Mato Grosso do Sul, FACOM, BR-79070900 Campo Grande, MS, Brazil
[5] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA
来源
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORK AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT | 2021年 / 18卷 / 03期
关键词
Internet; IP networks; Routing; Location awareness; Denial-of-service attack; Authentication; Volume measurement; IP spoofing; security; amplification; denial-of-service; routing policies; topology discovery;
D O I
10.1109/TNSM.2021.3061486
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The lack of authentication in the Internet's data plane allows hosts to falsify (spoof) the source IP address in packet headers. IP source spoofing is the basis for amplification denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Current approaches to locate sources of spoofed traffic lack coverage or are not deployable today. We propose a mechanism that a network with multiple peering links can use to coarsely locate the sources of spoofed traffic in the Internet. The idea behind our approach is that a network can monitor and map spoofed traffic arriving on a peering link to the set of sources routed toward that link. We propose mechanisms the network can use to systematically vary BGP announcement configurations to induce changes to Internet routes and to the set of sources routed to each peering link. A network using our technique can correlate observations over multiple configurations to more precisely delineate regions sending spoofed traffic. Evaluation of our techniques on the Internet shows that they can partition the Internet into small regions, allowing targeted intervention.
引用
收藏
页码:3170 / 3183
页数:14
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