Safeguarding interorganizational performance and continuity under ex post opportunism

被引:468
作者
Jap, SD [1 ]
Anderson, E
机构
[1] Emory Univ, Goizueta Business Sch, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
[2] INSEAD, F-77305 Fontainebleau, France
关键词
interorganizational performance; opportunism; relational safeguards; goal congruence; trust; contracts; idiosyncratic investments; transaction costs;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.49.12.1684.25112
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Opportunism is a central construct in exchange theory. Economists contend that despite the firm's best efforts to erect governance structures that reduce opportunism and preserve outcomes, there is always some opportunism that remains once the transaction is in,place. Despite this, there are few studies that systematically investigate the safeguarding efficacy of relationship attributes in the presence of such ex post opportunism. In this research, we develop a theoretical framework and provide a longitudinal test of the ability of various relationship safeguards to preserve performance outcomes and future expectations given varying levels of ex post opportunism in the relationship. Our survey results from over 300 buyers and suppliers indicates that given lower levels of opportunism, bilateral idiosyncratic investments and interpersonal trust enhance performance outcomes and future expectations, while goal congruence has no discernable effect. However, at higher levels of opportunism, goal congruence becomes a more powerful safeguard, while interpersonal trust becomes less effective. Bilateral idiosyncratic investments continue to preserve performance outcomes and future expectations even at higher levels of opportunism. Implications for the long-term management of interorganizational alliances are discussed.
引用
收藏
页码:1684 / 1701
页数:18
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