Does the Electoral System Foster a Predominant Party System? Evidence from Turkey

被引:18
|
作者
Arslantas, Duzgun [1 ]
Arslantas, Senol [3 ]
Kaiser, Andre [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cologne, Cologne Ctr Comparat Polit, Cologne, Germany
[2] Univ Cologne, Cologne Ctr Comparat Polit, Comparat Polit, Cologne, Germany
[3] Istanbul Univ, Dept Polit Sci & Int Relat, Istanbul, Turkey
关键词
AKP; dominant party; electoral system; electoral threshold; predominant party system; POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES; SPATIAL-ANALYSIS; AKP; NEOLIBERALISM; DISPROPORTIONALITY; DETERMINANTS; CLIENTELISM; TRANSITION; ELECTIONS; CLEAVAGES;
D O I
10.1111/spsr.12386
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
This paper discusses the role of the electoral system in making the Justice and Development Party (AKP) dominant. Drawing on Sartori's framework, we first clarify the concept of a predominant party system. Second, we examine the impact of the electoral system on the emergence of a predominant party system in Turkey. Analysing election results, we argue that the electoral system fosters dominance in three ways. First, a combination of electoral formula, national threshold and district threshold leads to over-representation of large parties and under-representation of small ones. Second, the fear of a wasted vote due to the high threshold prompts voters to support their second-best option, which concentrates the votes among large parties. Finally, the electoral system increases electoral turnout rates by extending polarization.
引用
收藏
页码:125 / 143
页数:19
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