LMAC: A Lightweight Message Authentication Code for Wireless Sensor Network

被引:15
作者
Chowdhury, Amrita Roy [1 ]
DasBit, Sipra [1 ]
机构
[1] Indian Inst Engn Sci & Technol, Dept Comp Sci & Tech, Sibpur, Howrah, India
来源
2015 IEEE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE (GLOBECOM) | 2015年
关键词
Wireless Sensor Network; Message Authentication Code; Authentication; Integrity; Passive Attack; Active Attack;
D O I
10.1109/GLOCOM.2015.7417118
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
Message authentication codes (MACs) are classically used for preventing unauthorized and corrupted messages from being forwarded in a network. However, inherent energy limitations of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) make the application of most of the state-of-the art MACs unaffordable due to their large computation overhead. Therefore in this paper, in order to cope with this challenging concern, we have proposed a lightweight hash based symmetric key message authentication code. The primary focus is on making the algorithm lightweight so that on using it in achieving secured communication in energy starved networks like WSNs, the resource constrained nodes can successfully run the algorithm. Detailed security analysis shows that LMAC also thwarts passive attack as well as active attack. Finally the comparative usability of the MAC in the said application domain is worked out and that shows the dominance of LMAC over several state-of-the-art MACs. We claim that on an average LMAC requires 61% less overhead compared to its competitors.
引用
收藏
页数:6
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