Strategic Analysis of the Online Recycler's Reselling Channel Selection: Agency or Self-Run

被引:9
作者
Guo, Qiang [1 ]
Li, Zenglu [1 ]
Nie, Jiajia [1 ]
机构
[1] Southwest Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Chengdu 610031, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
online recycler; resale channel; self-run model; agency model; SUPPLY CHAIN; VS; CLICKS; COMPETITION; WASTE; MANAGEMENT; COORDINATION; MARKETPLACE; BEHAVIOR; DESIGN; CHOICE;
D O I
10.3390/su12010078
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
With the rapid development of the internet, many WEEE (Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment) online recyclers have emerged and developed. They improve recycling efficiency significantly and bring hope for sustainable development. Unfortunately, few works in the literature are concerned about it, with many questions still unanswered. The WEEE online recyclers always face a challenge with regard to how to strategically design their reselling channel structure in fact. In this paper, we examined this challenge by two decision models: agency and self-run. We derived the performance of the self-run model and agency model by backward induction and then examined the desirability from different stakeholders' perspective. The results suggested that WEEE online recyclers prefer the self-run model to the agency model when the unit recycling cost is low and a conflict exists between the WEEE online recycler and e-retailer for the resale channel preference. Interestingly, the manufacturer shows consistent resale channel preference with the WEEE online recycler when the unit recycling cost is low. Our further analysis revealed that all players can agree on the agency model in a certain case. In addition, we found that the consumer surplus and the recovery ratio in the self-run model are always better than that in the agency model. Our work provides insight into the promotion of the WEEE online recycling industry and into the resale channel selection for online recyclers. The study also generates managerial insights for environmental sustainability.
引用
收藏
页数:19
相关论文
共 45 条
[1]   Agency Selling or Reselling? Channel Structures in Electronic Retailing [J].
Abhishek, Vibhanshu ;
Jerath, Kinshuk ;
Zhang, Z. John .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2016, 62 (08) :2259-2280
[2]   Remanufacturing, Third-Party Competition, and Consumers' Perceived Value of New Products [J].
Agrawal, Vishal V. ;
Atasu, Atalay ;
van Ittersum, Koert .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2015, 61 (01) :60-72
[3]   How Collection Cost Structure Drives a Manufacturer's Reverse Channel Choice [J].
Atasu, Atalay ;
Toktay, L. Beril ;
Van Wassenhove, Luk N. .
PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, 2013, 22 (05) :1089-1102
[4]   Management of electrical and electronic waste: A comparative evaluation of China and India [J].
Awasthi, Abhishek Kumar ;
Li, Jinhui .
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVIEWS, 2017, 76 :434-447
[5]   Bricks-and-mortar vs. "clicks-and-mortar": An equilibrium analysis [J].
Bernstein, Fernando ;
Song, Jing-Sheng ;
Zheng, Xiaona .
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2008, 187 (03) :671-690
[6]   Impact of Take-Back Regulation on the Remanufacturing Industry [J].
Esenduran, Gokce ;
Kemahlioglu-Ziya, Eda ;
Swaminathan, Jayashankar M. .
PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, 2017, 26 (05) :924-944
[7]   Strategic planning: Design and coordination for dual-recycling channel reverse supply chain considering consumer behavior [J].
Feng, Lipan ;
Govindan, Kannan ;
Li, Chunfa .
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2017, 260 (02) :601-612
[8]  
Ferguson ME, 2006, PROD OPER MANAG, V15, P351, DOI 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2006.tb00250.x
[9]  
Friedman J. W, 1986, Game Theory with Applications to Economics
[10]   Exploring "Internet plus Recycling": Mass balance and life cycle assessment of a waste management system associated with a mobile application [J].
Gu, Fu ;
Zhang, Wujie ;
Guo, Jianfeng ;
Hall, Philip .
SCIENCE OF THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT, 2019, 649 :172-185