On Ignorance: A Vindication of the Standard View

被引:32
作者
Le Morvan, Pierre [1 ]
机构
[1] Coll New Jersey, Dept Philosophy Relig & Class Studies, Ewing, NJ 08618 USA
关键词
Ignorance; Belief; Knowledge; Propositions; Facts; Truth;
D O I
10.1007/s11406-011-9330-9
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Rik Peels has once again forcefully argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he endeavors to refute the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and to advance what he calls the "New View" according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. I defend the Standard View against his new attempted refutation.
引用
收藏
页码:379 / 393
页数:15
相关论文
共 9 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 1995, ESSAY BELIEF ACCEPTA
[2]  
BRAITHWAITE RB, 1967, KNOWLEDGE BELIEF, P28
[3]   On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels [J].
LeMorvan, Pierre .
PHILOSOPHIA, 2011, 39 (02) :335-344
[4]  
Myers DG., 1994, Exploring Social Psychology
[5]   Ignorance is Lack of True Belief: A Rejoinder to Le Morvan [J].
Peels, Rik .
PHILOSOPHIA, 2011, 39 (02) :345-355
[6]   What Is Ignorance? [J].
Peels, Rik .
PHILOSOPHIA, 2010, 38 (01) :57-67
[7]  
Ramsey F.P., 1931, FDN MATH
[8]  
Ryle Gilbert., 1969, The Concept of Mind
[9]   A phenomenal, dispositional account of belief [J].
Schwitzgebel, E .
NOUS, 2002, 36 (02) :249-275