The analysis of the limit of obligatory offer for chosen sectors in Poland with the use of cooperative games

被引:0
|
作者
Sroczynska-Baron, Anna [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Econ Katowice, Dept Appl Math, PL-40287 Katowice, Poland
来源
MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN ECONOMICS (MME 2014) | 2014年
关键词
Banzhaf index; cooperative games; takeover;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Nowadays, taking over companies are becoming increasingly common in Europe. European Union, globalization and the competition increase make the taking over process necessary for existence and development of companies. Of course, one cannot buy every number of shares without any limitations. There are legal regulations relating to takeover bids and securities sale in each Member State. They should be according to European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25/EC of 21 April on takeover bids. The Directive establishes a framework of general requirements which Member States are to implement through more detailed rules in accordance with their national systems and cultural contexts. In Poland, the public offering act from 2005 met with many negative opinions. Ministry of Finance has been working on the amendment of the Act on a public offer to accommodate it to the low generally accepted in Europe. There is proposed two thresholds: 33% and 66% of securities for mandatory bids for all other holdings in both cases. However, one should consider that there are usually widely dispersed shareholders in countries with the threshold at the level of one - third. It seems to be not so obvious in Poland. In this work the structure of shareholders of chosen sectors in Poland is examined. The tools of cooperative games are used for consideration. The project of amendment of public offering act from 2005 in Poland is discussed. There is shown the possible solution of the problem of obligatory bids based on the theory of cooperative games.
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页码:950 / 955
页数:6
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