Conditional neutral punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

被引：30
作者：
Song, Qun [1 ]
Cao, Zhaoheng [2 ,3 ]
Tao, Rui [2 ,3 ]
Jiang, Wei [4 ]
Liu, Chen [5 ]
Liu, Jinzhuo [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Automat, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[2] Key Lab Software Engn Yunnan Prov, Kunming 650091, Yunnan, Peoples R China
[3] Yunnan Univ, Sch Software, Kunming 650504, Yunnan, Peoples R China
[4] Chinese Peoples Liberat Army, Unit 78102, Chengdu 610000, Sichuan, Peoples R China
[5] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Ctr Ecol & Environm Sci, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
来源：
APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION | 2020年 / 368卷
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Conditional punishment; Strategy-neutral punishment; Evolutionary games; Social dilemmas; Cooperation; COEVOLUTION; EVOLUTION; EMERGENCE; STRATEGY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.amc.2019.124798
中图分类号：
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号：
070104 ;
摘要：
Punishment plays an important role in promoting cooperation. In real society, individuals tend to punish other players based on certain conditions rather than punish them directly. Thus, we introduce a conditional neutral punishment mechanism and study how this mechanism affects the evolution of cooperation. Namely, an individual can punish his/her neighbors with the opposite strategy when his/her payoff is lower than the average payoff of his/her neighbors. The simulation results show that this mechanism promotes cooperation effectively even with antisocial punishment. By adopting such a mechanism, cooperative punishers form shields to protect cooperators inside, while defective punishers hide behind defectors without punishing anyone. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页数：7
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