The Impact of Vote Differentiation on Investment Performance in Listed Family Firms

被引：26

作者：

Bjuggren, Per-Olof ^{[2
]}

Palmberg, Johanna ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Jonkoping Int Business Sch, Dept Econ, SE-55111 Jonkoping, Sweden

[2] Ratio Inst, Stockholm, Sweden

来源：

FAMILY BUSINESS REVIEW | 2010年 / 23卷 / 04期

关键词：

corporate governance; family firms; dual-class shares; investments; firm performance; AGENCY COSTS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; MARGINAL-Q; OWNERSHIP; MANAGEMENT; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; RETURNS; ISSUES;

D O I：

10.1177/0894486510379001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This article investigates the effects of separation of ownership and control because of vote differentiation on listed family firms' investment performance. The authors study the question of whether family-controlled firms have better investment performance than nonfamily firms and whether this investment performance is negatively affected by a separation of ownership and control because of vote differentiation. Marginal q is used as a performance measure. The empirical analysis shows that family control has a positive impact on investment performance when ownership and control are aligned, whereas separation of ownership and control in terms of vote-differentiated shares reduce investment performance.

引用

页码：327 / 340

页数：14

共 60 条

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