Multi-Item Spectrum Auction for Recall-Based Cognitive Radio Networks With Multiple Heterogeneous Secondary Users

被引:42
作者
Yi, Changyan [1 ]
Cai, Jun [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Manitoba, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Winnipeg, MB R3T 5V6, Canada
基金
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词
Cognitive radio (CR); dynamic spectrum access (DSA); quality-of-service (QoS); spectrum auction; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism; ALLOCATION; FRAMEWORK; EFFICIENT; MECHANISM;
D O I
10.1109/TVT.2014.2322072
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
In this paper, we consider a spectrum auction system among heterogeneous secondary users (SUs) with various quality-of-service (QoS) requirements and a recall-based primary base station (PBS) that could recall channels after auction to deal with a sudden increase in its own demand. Beginning with proposing a recall-based single-winner spectrum auction (RSSA) algorithm, we further extend our work to allow multiple winners in order to improve the spectrum utilization and propose a recall-based multiple-winner spectrum auction (RMSA) algorithm. A combinatorial auction model is then formulated, and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is applied in the payment function. Moreover, the proposed RMSA algorithm focuses on a fair spectrum allocation among heterogeneous SUs and the increase in the PBS's auction revenue. Both theoretical and simulation results show that the proposed spectrum auction algorithm can improve the spectrum utilization with guarantees on SUs' heterogeneous QoS requirements.
引用
收藏
页码:781 / 792
页数:12
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