Dynastic control without ownership: Evidence from post-war Japan

被引:10
作者
Bennedsen, Morten [1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ]
Mehrotra, Vikas [6 ]
Shim, Jungwook [7 ]
Wiwattanakantang, Yupana [8 ]
机构
[1] CEPR, London, England
[2] DFI, Paris, France
[3] ECGI, Paris, France
[4] INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France
[5] Univ Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
[6] Univ Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada
[7] Kyoto Sangyo Univ, Kyoto, Japan
[8] Natl Univ Singapore, Business Sch, Singapore, Singapore
关键词
Family control; Ownership; Succession; FOUNDING-FAMILY OWNERSHIP; FIRM PERFORMANCE; AGENCY COSTS; DECISIONS; BANKS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.018
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding-family CEOs while the family owns an in-significant share of equity (defined as less than 5%). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki, and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes family ownership over time. In turn, the transi-tion from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of family legacy and talent. (c) 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:831 / 843
页数:13
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