Information, Preferences, and Public Benefit Participation: Experimental Evidence from the Advance EITC and 401(k) Savings

被引:39
作者
Jones, Damon [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Stanford Inst Econ Policy Res, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Univ Chicago, Harris Sch, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
关键词
CREDIT;
D O I
10.1257/app.2.2.147
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Within a field experiment, I present a treatment group with reductions in information, administrative, stigma, and procrastination costs associated with the Advance EITC. The treatment increases Advance participation from 0.3 to 1.2 percent. Another treatment simultaneously encourages 401(k) savings, increasing 401(k) participation from 46 to 50 percent. However, there is no additional increase in Advance participation when coupled with the 401(k) treatment, casting doubt on a long-term forced savings motive. The results indicate that EITC recipients actively forgo the Advance. Further work is needed to identify what underlies these preferences. Possible explanations include uncertainty and/or short-term forced savings motives. (JEL D14, D82, H23, H24, H31)
引用
收藏
页码:147 / 163
页数:17
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