Pragmatism and the Limits to the European Parliament's Strategies for Self-Empowerment

被引:12
作者
Closa Montero, Carlos [1 ,2 ]
Gonzalez De Leon, Felipe [1 ]
Hernandez Gonzalez, Gisela [1 ]
机构
[1] Spanish Natl Res Council, Inst Publ Goods & Policies, Madrid, Spain
[2] European Univ Inst, Sch Transnatl Governance, Fiesole, Italy
关键词
accountability; Covid-19; economic governance; economic policy; empowerment; European Parliament; negotiation; ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE; COUNCIL; REFORM;
D O I
10.17645/pag.v9i3.4243
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Despite the European Parliament's (EP) growing role, its influence and scrutiny capacity remain considerably weaker than the role traditionally reserved for parliaments in economic and fiscal policy decision-making at the national level. The EP has exploited any opportunity to enhance these powers: In particular, the EP has a record of using crisis and extraordinary situations to expand its role beyond the formal prerogatives given to the institution. Following this literature, this article examines the role and influence of the EP on economic and fiscal policy, focusing on the response to the Covid-19 crisis. Negotiation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility presents an auspicious area to analyse the strategies implemented by the EP to influence the outcome and reinforce its position in EU economic governance. The article will look specifically at the formal and informal mechanisms used by the EP during the crisis to expand its powers. Moreover, it utilises a research design that combines the content analysis of several official/public documents and statements from key members of the European Parliament (MEPs) involved in economic policy.
引用
收藏
页码:163 / 174
页数:12
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