Do good deeds make bad people?

被引:42
作者
Clot, Sophie [1 ]
Grolleau, Gilles [2 ]
Ibanez, Lisette [3 ]
机构
[1] ENSAM, UMR 1135, LAMETA, 2 Pl Pierre Viala,Bat 26, F-34060 Montpellier 1, France
[2] ENSAM, LAMETA, UMR 1135, Burgundy Sch Business,LESSAC, Montpellier, France
[3] INRA, LAMETA, UMR 1135, Montpellier, France
关键词
Environment; Regulation; Self-licensing; Voluntary approaches; MORAL SELF; INCENTIVES; PARADIGM;
D O I
10.1007/s10657-014-9441-4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
According to the so-called 'self-licensing effect', committing to a virtuous act in a preceding choice may lead to behave less virtuously in the succeeding decision. Consequently, well-intentioned policies can lead to overall counter-productive effects by licensing people to behave badly in related behaviors. On the other side, motivational crowding theory argues that constraining people to adopt a desirable behavior can backfire. We use of a classroom experiment to test whether a regulatory framework to incentivize individuals to adopt pro-environmental behavior generate similar spillovers in terms of licensing effect than a non-regulatory framework. We show that the way the good deed is caused doesn't seem to influence the licensing effect. Nevertheless, we found that business- and environmental-orientated majors react adversely to the regulatory framework. We show that environmental-orientated students exhibit higher intrinsically motivations than business-orientated ones. Accordingly, we suggest that the licensing effect is more likely to arise when the preceding 'virtuous' act is freely chosen (respectively regulatory caused) for non-intrinsically (respectively intrinsically) motivated individuals.
引用
收藏
页码:491 / 513
页数:23
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