Relative Unemployment, Political Information, and the Job Approval Ratings of State Governors and Legislatures

被引:5
作者
Cohen, Jeffrey E. [1 ]
机构
[1] Fordham Univ, Polit Sci, Bronx, NY 10458 USA
关键词
job approval; governors; executive politics; state legislatures; economic policy; public policy; issue preferences; public opinion; ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY; GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS; ECONOMIC-CONDITIONS; PARTISAN DIFFERENCES; POLICY OUTCOMES; PERFORMANCE; POPULARITY; VOTE; PERCEPTIONS; FEDERALISM;
D O I
10.1177/1532440020905800
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Research finds that voters benchmark the state's unemployment level to the nation's when holding state policy makers accountable. Yet benchmarking requires some voter knowledge if the standard is to be applied correctly as an accountability rule. This article leverages the fact that voters have more knowledge about their state governors than legislatures assess how much knowledge is necessary for holding these policy makers accountable. Using pooled Cooperative Congressional Election Study data from 2006 to 2016, results find that knowledge has stronger mediating effects for the state legislature than governor. Furthermore, despite the low knowledge levels among voters about the state legislature, collectively there appears to be enough knowledge to hold that policymaking body accountable. The conclusion offers directions for future research.
引用
收藏
页码:437 / 461
页数:25
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