ARISTOTLE'S DE ANIMA: ON WHY THE SOUL IS NOT A SET OF CAPACITIES

被引：5

作者：

Johnston, Rebekah ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Wilfrid Laurier Univ, Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5, Canada

来源：

BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY | 2011年 / 19卷 / 02期

关键词：

Aristotle; soul; actuality; power; capacity; metaphysics;

D O I：

10.1080/09608788.2011.555158

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Although it is common for interpreters of Aristotle's De Anima to treat the soul as a specially related set of powers of capacities, I argue against this view on the grounds that the plausible options for reconciling the claim that the soul is a set of powers with Aristotle's repeated claim that the soul is an actuality cannot be unsuccessful. Moreover, I argue that there are good reasons to be wary of attributing to Aristotle the view that the soul is a set of powers because this claim conflicts with several of his metaphysical commitments, most importantly his claims about form and substance. I argue that although there are passages in the De Anima in which Aristotle discusses the soul in terms of its powers or capacities, these discussions do not establish that the soul is a set of capacities.

引用

页码：185 / 200

页数：16

共 11 条

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[9]

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