Correlated equilibrium and potential games

被引：85

作者：

Neyman, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] SUNY STONY BROOK,INST DECIS SCI,STONY BROOK,NY 11794

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1997年 / 26卷 / 02期

关键词：

Economic Theory; Game Theory; Pure Strategy; Strategy Profile; Strategic Game;

D O I：

10.1007/BF01295851

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Any correlated equilibrium of a strategic game with bounded payoffs and convex strategy sets which has a smooth concave potential, is a mixture of pure strategy profiles which maximize the potential. If moreover, the strategy sets are compact and the potential is strictly concave, then the game has a unique correlated equilibrium.

引用

页码：223 / 227

页数：5