JAST: Fully Syntactic Detection of Malicious (Obfuscated) Java']JavaScript

被引:52
作者
Fass, Aurore [1 ]
Krawczyk, Robert P. [2 ]
Backes, Michael [3 ]
Stock, Ben [3 ]
机构
[1] Saarland Univ, CISPA, Saarland Informat Campus, Saarbrucken, Germany
[2] German Fed Off Informat Secur BSI, Bonn, Germany
[3] CISPA Helmholtz Ctr iG, Saarland Informat Campus, Saarbrucken, Germany
来源
DETECTION OF INTRUSIONS AND MALWARE, AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT, DIMVA 2018 | 2018年 / 10885卷
关键词
D O I
10.1007/978-3-319-93411-2_14
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
JavaScript is a browser scripting language initially created to enhance the interactivity of web sites and to improve their user-friendliness. However, as it offloads the work to the user's browser, it can be used to engage in malicious activities such as Crypto Mining, Drive-by Download attacks, or redirections to web sites hosting malicious software. Given the prevalence of such nefarious scripts, the antivirus industry has increased the focus on their detection. The attackers, in turn, make increasing use of obfuscation techniques, so as to hinder analysis and the creation of corresponding signatures. Yet these malicious samples share syntactic similarities at an abstract level, which enables to bypass obfuscation and detect even unknown malware variants. In this paper, we present JAST, a low-overhead solution that combines the extraction of features from the abstract syntax tree with a random forest classifier to detect malicious JavaScript instances. It is based on a frequency analysis of specific patterns, which are either predictive of benign or of malicious samples. Even though the analysis is entirely static, it yields a high detection accuracy of almost 99.5% and has a low false-negative rate of 0.54%.
引用
收藏
页码:303 / 325
页数:23
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