On the joint engagement of persons: Self-consciousness, the symmetry thesis and person perception

Jose Luis Bermudez has presented an argument for the "Symmetry Thesis"-that a subject's psychological awareness is constitutively linked to his awareness of other minds-by outlining an account of joint engagement. I critique Bermudez's Neo-Lockean account of joint engagement. Since it depends upon a psychological sortal, it cannot show that self-ascription is constituted by intersubjective relations in joint engagement. It is also too rich because grasping sortals-especially a psychological sortal-is a more difficult ability than joint engagement. Instead of the Neo-Lockean account, I propose the "Persons Theory" of joint engagement, according to which the recognition and acknowledgement of oneself as a person among persons is central. I argue that the Persons Theory can show that self-ascription is constituted by intersubjective relations in joint engagement and is not too rich, because recognition and acknowledgement of persons is not a more difficult ability than joint engagement. I offer two objections to my argument, and overturn both. I conclude by suggesting that the Persons Theory provides a genuinely new account of mentalizing that differs from the theory-theory and the simulation theory.