Bayesian network and game theory risk assessment model for third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines

被引:84
作者
Cui, Yan [1 ,2 ]
Quddus, Noor [1 ]
Mashuga, Chad, V [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Mary Kay OConnor Proc Safety Ctr, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
[2] Texas A&M Univ, Artie McFerrin Dept Chem Engn, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
关键词
Bayesian network; Game theory; Pipeline damage; Risk assessment; Pipeline safety; Pipeline hazard assessment; THEORETICAL MODEL; SECURITY; SAFETY; FRAMEWORK; FAILURES;
D O I
10.1016/j.psep.2019.11.038
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
Tremendous amounts of oil and gas products are transported in pipelines worldwide resulting in increasing interest to identify the hazards and evaluate the associated risks associated with this critical infrastructure. Third-party intrusion is one of the least quantifiable factors being considered during the pipeline hazard assessment stage despite the substantial contributing to the total number of oil and gas pipeline incidents. This is because a probabilistic risk assessment cannot reliably model human actions and be applied to intentional acts. Due to the distinctive motivations of third-party damage, an unintentional third-party damage Bayesian Network model and a game-theoretic model on malicious intrusion will therefore be built, to examine the mechanism of pipeline failure caused by this mode. This study is conducted aiming at investigating pipeline risk resulting from third-party damage, and will formulate risk assessment models to identify threats, prioritize risks and determine which integrity plan should apply to different pipeline segments given the condition of third-party interference (both the accidental damage and malicious acts). (C) 2019 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:178 / 188
页数:11
相关论文
共 50 条
[31]  
Mather J., 2001, An Assessment of Measures in Use for Gas Pipelines to Mitigate Against Damage Caused by Third Party Activity
[32]  
Morgenstern O., 1953, THEORY GAMES EC BEHA
[33]  
Muhlbauer W.K., 2004, PIPELINE RISK MANAGE, V3rd
[34]  
Myerson R.B., 2013, GameTheory
[35]  
One-Call Systems, 1991, PIPELINE DIGEST
[36]  
Parfomak P.W., 2004, Pipeline security: An overview of federal activites and current policy issues
[37]   Overall reliability analysis on oil/gas pipeline under typical third-party actions based on fragility theory [J].
Peng, Xing-yu ;
Yao, Dong-chi ;
Liang, Guang-chuan ;
Yu, Jian-sheng ;
He, Sha .
JOURNAL OF NATURAL GAS SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING, 2016, 34 :993-1003
[38]  
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 2017, PIP HAZ MAT SAF ADM
[39]  
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 2005, INC REP FORM FORM F7
[40]  
Rezazadeh A, 2018, APPL GAME THEORY SEC