Why Trump shot the Sheriffs: The end of WTO dispute settlement 1.0

被引：19
作者：
Bown, Chad P. [1 ]
Keynes, Soumaya [2 ]
机构：
[1] Peterson Inst Int Econ, 1750 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 USA
[2] Economist, 1730 Rhode Isl Ave NW 1210, Washington, DC 20036 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF POLICY MODELING | 2020年 / 42卷 / 04期
关键词：
WTO; Dispute settlement; Appellate Body; Antidumping; Trade remedies; TRADE AGREEMENTS; POLICY UNCERTAINTY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jpolmod.2020.03.006
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码：799 / 819
页数：21
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