Deceiving Network Reconnaissance Using SDN-Based Virtual Topologies

被引:57
作者
Achleitner, Stefan [1 ]
La Porta, Thomas F. [4 ]
McDaniel, Patrick [4 ,5 ]
Sugrim, Shridatt [2 ]
Krishnamurthy, Srikanth V. [3 ]
Chadha, Ritu [2 ]
机构
[1] Penn State Univ, Comp Sci & Engn, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
[2] Vencore Labs, Basking Ridge, NJ 07920 USA
[3] Univ Calif Riverside, Comp Sci, Riverside, CA 92521 USA
[4] Penn State Univ, Sch Elect Engn & Comp Sci, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
[5] Penn State Univ, Inst Networking & Secur Res, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
来源
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORK AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT | 2017年 / 14卷 / 04期
关键词
Software-defined networks; security services; security management;
D O I
10.1109/TNSM.2017.2724239
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Advanced targeted cyber attacks often rely on reconnaissance missions to gather information about potential targets, their characteristics and location to identify vulnerabilities in a networked environment. Advanced network scanning techniques are often used for this purpose and are automatically executed by malware infected hosts. In this paper, we formally define network deception to defend reconnaissance and develop a reconnaissance deception system, which is based on software defined networking, to achieve deception by simulating virtual topologies. Our system thwarts network reconnaissance by delaying the scanning techniques of adversaries and invalidating their collected information, while limiting the performance impact on benign network traffic. By simulating the topological as well as physical characteristics of networks, we introduce a system which deceives malicious network discovery and reconnaissance techniques with virtual information, while limiting the information an attacker is able to harvest from the true underlying system. This approach shows a novel defense technique against adversarial reconnaissance missions which are required for targeted cyber attacks such as advanced persistent threats in highly connected environments. The defense steps of our system aim to invalidate an attackers information, delay the process of finding vulnerable hosts and identify the source of adversarial reconnaissance within a network.
引用
收藏
页码:1098 / 1112
页数:15
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