Fiscal incentives and land finance cycles of prefectures in China

Land finance has become one of the important major sources of fiscal revenue for Chinese local governments. The spatial allocation of land use constitutes a land-leasing policy operation of local officials, contributing to local economic development and fluctuation. Applying data from 283 prefectural units from 2003 to 2012, this paper explores the existence of land finance cycles, focussing on the changes of the amount (as in 'area') of land-leasing by negotiation or by auction. The empirical results suggest that land finance cycles synchronise with the PCCP (Provincial Congress of the Communist Party) cycles, in which a prefectural leader decreases the amount of land leased through negotiation and increases that of land leased through auction prior to the year of the PCCP. The findings of empirical results are consistent with the prediction of our theoretical model. Additionally, due to the existence of high uncertainty of prefectural leaders' tenure and political turnover, the effect of prefectural leaders' tenure on land finance cycles is more apparent in the early years of their tenure. The results indicate that Chinese leaders' fiscal strategies are likely to be driven by career concerns for the purpose of maximising a measured economic performance and fiscal rents.