Retailers' risk management and vertical arrangements in electricity markets

被引:36
作者
Boroumand, Raphael Homayoun [1 ,2 ]
Zachmann, Georg [3 ]
机构
[1] EHESS, Paris, France
[2] CNRS, CIRED, Paris, France
[3] Bruegel, Brussels, Belgium
关键词
Electricity; Retailer; Risk; COST; INTEGRATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.enpol.2011.10.041
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The failure of the asset-light retailer's organizational model is indicative of the incapacity of this organizational structure to manage efficiently the combination of sourcing and market risks in the current market environment. Because of the structural dimensions of electricity's market risks, a retailer's level of risk exposure is unknown ex ante and will only be revealed ex post when consumption is known. In contrast to the "textbook model" of electricity reforms, the paper demonstrates through numerical simulations that in the current market context pure portfolios of contracts are incomplete risk management instruments compared to physical hedging. The latter is critical to overcome the asset-light retailer's curse. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:465 / 472
页数:8
相关论文
共 39 条
  • [1] Anderson A., 2007, ENERGY POLICY, V35
  • [2] [Anonymous], 1985, SSRN Scholarly Paper 1496720
  • [3] [Anonymous], CEPR DISCUSSION PAPE
  • [4] Bailey JosephP., 1998, Intermediation and electronic markets: Aggregation and pricing in Internet commerce
  • [5] Boroumand R.H., 2008, REV ENERGIE JUL
  • [6] Brousseau E., 2002, The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications
  • [7] Chao HP, 2008, COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, PERFORMANCE, P27, DOI 10.1016/B978-008047172-3.50005-2
  • [8] THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST
    COASE, RH
    [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1960, 3 (OCT) : 1 - 44
  • [9] Coeurderoy R., 1997, REV ECON POLIT, V107, P146
  • [10] Cornwall Energy and EEE Ltd, 2008, PRACT PRINC EL RET M