A Systematic Review of Re-Identification Attacks on Health Data

被引:222
作者
El Emam, Khaled [1 ,2 ]
Jonker, Elizabeth [1 ]
Arbuckle, Luk [1 ]
Malin, Bradley [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] CHEO Res Inst, Elect Hlth Informat Lab, Ottawa, ON, Canada
[2] Univ Ottawa, Dept Paediat, Ottawa, ON, Canada
[3] Vanderbilt Univ, Dept Biomed Informat, Nashville, TN USA
[4] Vanderbilt Univ, Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Nashville, TN USA
来源
PLOS ONE | 2011年 / 6卷 / 12期
基金
美国国家卫生研究院;
关键词
PRIVACY; METAANALYSIS; TECHNOLOGY; RECORDS; ACCESS;
D O I
10.1371/journal.pone.0028071
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Background: Privacy legislation in most jurisdictions allows the disclosure of health data for secondary purposes without patient consent if it is de-identified. Some recent articles in the medical, legal, and computer science literature have argued that de-identification methods do not provide sufficient protection because they are easy to reverse. Should this be the case, it would have significant and important implications on how health information is disclosed, including: (a) potentially limiting its availability for secondary purposes such as research, and (b) resulting in more identifiable health information being disclosed. Our objectives in this systematic review were to: (a) characterize known re-identification attacks on health data and contrast that to re-identification attacks on other kinds of data, (b) compute the overall proportion of records that have been correctly re-identified in these attacks, and (c) assess whether these demonstrate weaknesses in current de-identification methods. Methods and Findings: Searches were conducted in IEEE Xplore, ACM Digital Library, and PubMed. After screening, fourteen eligible articles representing distinct attacks were identified. On average, approximately a quarter of the records were re-identified across all studies (0.26 with 95% CI 0.046-0.478) and 0.34 for attacks on health data (95% CI 0-0.744). There was considerable uncertainty around the proportions as evidenced by the wide confidence intervals, and the mean proportion of records re-identified was sensitive to unpublished studies. Two of fourteen attacks were performed with data that was de-identified using existing standards. Only one of these attacks was on health data, which resulted in a success rate of 0.00013. Conclusions: The current evidence shows a high re-identification rate but is dominated by small-scale studies on data that was not de-identified according to existing standards. This evidence is insufficient to draw conclusions about the efficacy of de-identification methods.
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页数:12
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