The years since 1991 have seen a significant growth in the autonomy of Russia's regions from the federal centre.1 Although decentralisation is recognised to play an important part in the transition to democracy and the development of market economies, most obervers would agree that in Russian the loss of central power to the regions has gone too far. Using the resources at their disposal, and benefiting from central weakness, regional leaders have gained increasing jurisdiction over their own affairs, ignoring federal laws and taking control of federal agencies in their regions. The power of regional leaders has grown to such an extent that it significantly impedes the implementation of presidential policy.2 What is more, many of Russia's regions, far from acting as 'laboratories of democracy', have developed into near autocracies, dominated by their governors or presidents, who marginalise the regional legislatures.3 According to Huskey, regional elites are becoming the 'brokers of Russia's political future'.4 Putin's policies and public pronouncements, both before and after his accession to the presidency, show that he considers the reversal of this process to be a priority task.5 Since the beginning of 2000 there has been a dramatic increase in measures designed to restore power.6 The most significant development, however, came with the start of Putin's 'federal' reforms. On 13 May 2000 Putin issued a decree reforming the institution of Presidential Representative in the regions, and dividing Russia into seven federal districts. The decree was swiftly followed on 19 May by a package of reform bills which change the way in which members of the upper house of the legislature (the Federation Council) are selected, give the President the right to dismiss regional leaders, and allow regional leaders to dismiss heads of local government. Accoridng to Putin, the main aim of his reforms is to strengthen the vertical chain of command (vertikal) through which presidential policies are implemented.7.
