Choosing a partner for social exchange: Charitable giving as a signal of trustworthiness

被引:21
作者
Fehrler, Sebastian [1 ,2 ]
Przepiorka, Wojtek [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Konstanz, Dept Econ, Box 131, D-78457 Constance, Germany
[2] Univ Zurich, Dept Polit Sci, Affolternstr 56, CH-8050 Zurich, Switzerland
[3] Univ Utrecht, Dept Sociol, Padualaan 14, NL-3584 CH Utrecht, Netherlands
[4] Univ Oxford Nuffield Coll, New Rd, Oxford OX1 1NF, England
基金
瑞士国家科学基金会;
关键词
Costly signaling; Social preferences; Trust; Trustworthiness; Partner choice; Corporate social responsibility; Electoral competition; COMPETITIVE ALTRUISM; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; BIOLOGICAL MARKETS; EXPERIMENTAL TESTS; TRUST; CHOICE; SELECTION; GAME; RESPONSIBILITY; COOPERATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
People benefit from being perceived as trustworthy. Examples include sellers trying to attract buyers, or candidates in elections trying to attract voters. In a laboratory experiment using exchange games, in which the trustor can choose the trustee, we study whether trustees can signal their trustworthiness by giving to charity. Our results show that donors are indeed perceived as more trustworthy and they are selected significantly more often as interaction partners. As a consequence of this sorting pattern, relative payoffs to donors and non-donors differ substantially with and without partner choice. However, we do not find donors to be significantly more trustworthy than non-donors. Our findings suggest that publicly observable generosity, such as investments in corporate social responsibility or donations to charity during a political campaign, can induce perceptions of trustworthiness and trust. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:157 / 171
页数:15
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