Rank-Dependent Utility, Tax Evasion, and Labor Supply

被引：3

作者：

Eide, Erling ^{[1
]}

von Simson, Kristine ^{[1
]}

Strom, Steinar ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oslo, N-0317 Oslo, Norway

来源：

FINANZARCHIV-EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC FINANCE | 2011年 / 67卷 / 03期

关键词：

labor supply; tax evasion; rank-dependent utility; PROSPECT-THEORY; DECISION;

D O I：

10.1628/001522111X600597

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

In a portfolio model of tax evasion an expected utility maximizer will cheat more than what is estimated in empirical studies. At least two types of explanation have been suggested as solutions to this puzzle: (1) taxpayers act according to some unexpected utility theory, and (2) individual ethical norms and social stigma induce people not to cheat. Based on Norwegian survey data, we find that a rank-dependent expected-utility model performs better than an expected-utility model and that social norms matter in explaining behavior.

引用

页码：261 / 281

页数：21

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[Anonymous], SIZE CAUSES CONSEQUE

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