Crisis and non-crisis short selling and bank enforcement actions

被引：2

作者：

Boni, Leslie ^{[1
]}

Leach, J. Chris ^{[2
]}

White, Reilly S. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Calif State Univ Monterey Bay, Seaside, CA 93955 USA

[2] Univ Colorado, Leeds Sch Business, 995 Regent Dr, Boulder, CO 80309 USA

[3] Univ New Mexico, Anderson Sch Management, MSC05 3090,1 Univ New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 2021年 / 132卷

关键词：

Enforcement actions; Short selling; Short interest; Regulation; Banking; SHORT SELLERS; PERFORMANCE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106235

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Employing standard informed trading intuition, we develop testable hypotheses regarding short selling before and after bank enforcement action (EA) initiations. For U.S.-listed bank firm data for 2007 to 2012, we find strong support for differentiated short seller activity and skill in crisis versus non-crisis periods. In financial crises, short sellers predominantly position prior to EAs. The EA initiations then act as information-homogenizing and profit-taking events reducing incentives to remain positioned. In contrast, EAs in non-crisis periods appear to serve as wake-up calls that attract additional short selling. Our findings offer potentially important insights for regulators considering short sellers' reactions to EA announcements in general, during financial crises, and when not experiencing a broad financial crisis. (c) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ )

引用

页数：13