The sequential prisoner's dilemma: Evidence on reciprocation

被引:141
作者
Clark, K [1 ]
Sefton, M
机构
[1] Univ Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England
[2] Univ Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1468-0297.00588
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
we investigate how fairness concerns influence individual behaviour in social dilemmas. Using a Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma experiment we analyse the extent to which co-operation is conditional on first-mover co-operation, repetition, economic incentives, subject pool (United Kingdom vs. United States) and gender. We find the most important variable influencing cooperation is the first-mover's choice, supporting the argument that co-operative behaviour in social dilemmas reflects reciprocation rather than unconditional altruism. However, we also find that cooperation decreases with repetition, and reciprocation falls as its material cost rises.
引用
收藏
页码:51 / 68
页数:18
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