Public Expenditure Preferences in Spain: Self-interest or Values?

被引:5
作者
Cicuendez Santamaria, Ruth [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Rey Juan Carlos Madrid, Madrid, Spain
来源
REVISTA ESPANOLA DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCIOLOGICAS | 2017年 / 160期
关键词
Public Spending; Self-Interest; Public Opinion; Public Policies; Symbolic; Predispositions; GREAT RECESSION; ATTITUDES; POLICY; IDEOLOGY; OPINION; SUPPORT; WELFARE; POLITICS; DEMANDS; ISSUE;
D O I
10.5477/cis/reis.160.19
中图分类号
C91 [社会学];
学科分类号
030301 ; 1204 ;
摘要
This article analyses the factors that condition the public expenditure preferences of citizens in Spain. It focuses on the role that individuals' economic motivations, ideology and values play in forming these preferences. Two theories were selected for this purpose: self-interest theory and symbolic predispositions. An empirical analysis showed that demographic and economic characteristics such as citizens' ideology and values influence how specific demands for public spending are articulated. In addition, the best predictors of the preferences in each public spending programmes are identified. The conclusion is that the impact of self-interest and symbolic predispositions varies significantly depending on the nature of the different public policies.
引用
收藏
页码:19 / 37
页数:19
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